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While it would appear that the decision toincorporate or subsume the Directorateof Special Operations (or Scorpions),
into the South African Police Service (SAPS) is a fait
accompli, the process of incorporation will not be
straightforward. This is largely because the decision
to disband the Scorpions is politically motivated,
rather than motivated by practical concerns around
the functionality of the unit. 
There are a number of practical obstacles to the
disbandment of the unit. These obstacles relate
fundamentally to the fact that the methods used by
the Scorpions to undertake investigations cannot
easily be incorporated into the police. These
include: 
• The use of a ‘preparatory investigation’ or 
enquiry
• The use of teams of multi-disciplinary 
investigators, prosecutors and intelligence
analysts
• The reliance on the collection of crime 
information/intelligence 
• The type of specialist training members receive
• The specialised focus of the investigations and 
their selection on the basis of being ‘high
profile’, combined with the probability of
obtaining successful convictions 
• The types of crime focused upon 
Additional issues that complicate incorporation are
the sense of elitism (esprit de corps) that was built
up around the unit; that the DSO investigators were
used to lower case loads (than SAPS detectives);
and the fact that they have been better paid and





DSO into the SAPS1
While it would appear that the motivations to incorporate the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) or
Scorpions into a new South African Police Service directorate are largely politically driven, there are a number
of practical obstacles standing in the way of a ‘smooth’ incorporation. Foremost among these is the manner of
operations of the Scorpions, the way that they investigate certain crimes by means of prosecution-led teams,
and their more effective use of intelligence-driven crime information. This is diametrically opposed to the SAPS
investigation modus operandi, which is largely reactive. Furthermore, many of the Scorpions investigators,
representing as they do a vast pool of built up experience and expertise, do not want to serve in the SAPS
under the latter’s investigating regime. Other sticking points would be the fact that they are paid infinitely
better than SAPS detectives, are better funded and resourced, have a far lighter case load (and one shared in a
team) – all in direct contrast to members of the SAPS. 
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also enjoyed a great deal more independence than
the SAPS,2 reporting directly, as they do, to the
Director of Public Prosecutions (via the DSO
Director) who in turn is accountable directly to the
President (although, again this is nominally
supposed to be through the Minister of Justice).
Only then do they report to Parliament via the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Justice. 
Background and legislative context
In 1998 Parliament legislated for the establishment
of a National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) with a
Director of National Prosecutions to replace the old
Attorneys General’s offices nationally and
provincially. At the same time this legislation – the
National Prosecuting Authority Act (No 32 of 1998)
– made provision for the President to establish
‘Investigating Directorates’ (not more than three
were to be allowed) to reside in the Office of the
National Director of Public Prosecutions (National
Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998: s7(1a)).
This Act allowed investigating directors to
investigate any matter relating to an offence or a
suspected offence by means of an ‘enquiry’ or a so-
called ‘preparatory investigation’ (NPA Act 1998:
s28(1)). Such an inquiry was allowed to be held in
camera (NPA Act 1998: s28(3)). Moreover, an
investigating director in such an enquiry
(preparatory investigation) could call any person to
give evidence, obtain any document, seize any
computer (as evidence), and enter and search any
premises (with reference to the applicable sections
for warrants and searches in the Criminal Procedure
Act) in connection with the alleged offence or
suspected commissioning of any specified offence
(NPA Act 1998: s28(6&7); s29(1&2)). On the basis
of such an enquiry a full-blown criminal
investigation could be launched by the NPA.
Although the forerunner of the DSO – the
Investigative Directorate for Organised Crime
(IDOC) – was set up on 1 September 1999, the
DSO was formally established by means of the
National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act No
61 of 2000. This Act specified that because of its
‘limited investigative capacity’ it needed to
concentrate on investigating organised crime,
violent crimes, political violence, terrorism, serious
economic crime, and corruption in the police,
criminal justice system and security forces. This was
important later when the the Anti-Corruption Unit of
the SAPS was disbanded in 2003.
The Amendment to the Act specifically tasked the
DSO to undertake investigations and to ‘carry out
any functions incidental to investigations’.
Furthermore, it was tasked to ‘gather, keep and
analyse information’ (NPAA Act 2000: s7(1a(i-iii)(aa-
bb)). This Act also replaced ‘enquiry’ throughout the
Act with the word ‘investigation’ and for the first
time used the word ‘Special Investigator’. The
amended Act also refers to the DSO acting on the
existence of ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence
had been committed or was being contemplated
and planned (NPAA Act 2000: s13(b)(b)). 
Accordingly the initiation of ‘preparatory
investigations’ was strongly premised on the
collection of information and crime intelligence, as
well as on information submitted to them. The
DSO’s use of crime information/intelligence-driven
investigation and prosecution as a modus operandi
was innovative and more advanced than the SAPS’
more recent intelligence-led policing.3 The amended
Act set up a Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee to
co-ordinate operations (intended to be applicable to
all agencies within the Criminal Justice System) as
well as to oversee communication and the transfer
of relevant information to the DSO (NPAA Act 2000:
s31). In addition, the Committee was tasked to
ensure that DSO investigators adhered to a ‘Code of
Conduct for Special Investigators’ (NPAA Act 2000:
s41(2)(n)). This was the first time a specific code for
investigators had been developed and implemented. 
This pointed to the fact that a ‘new’ kind of
investigation process was underway, that specifically
emphasised the use of information/intelligence in
directing investigations. A further innovation was the
fact that the unit operated on a team basis. Teams
were headed by prosecutors and included special
investigators and intelligence gatherers and analysts,
who all worked together to ensure that such a
focused investigation yielded enough evidence for
conviction. This was loosely modelled on the
investigative methods of the USA Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). 
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DSO vs SAPS methods of investigation
This way of operating is fundamentally different to
the way SAPS detectives investigate a crime. Police
detectives respond to a crime being committed
(reactive), possibly need to secure a crime scene,
collect evidence, open a docket, make further
investigations and then hand over such docket of
evidence to the Prosecution Services for evaluation.
The Prosecution Services decide whether the case
should proceed to court for a possible prosecution
and eventual conviction. In most cases the first time
a prosecutor has contact with the individual
detective or has insight into the case evidence is
when s/he is presented with a completed case.
Experience has shown that this often leads to
dockets being rejected by prosecutors or cases being
struck off the roll even before they come to court,
simply because they are under- or ill-prepared by
the overworked and overburdened SAPS detectives,
or because the evidence has been poorly or
inadequately collected and the investigation has, in
many cases, been substandard and/or rushed.
In contrast, placing a prosecutor at the head of the
DSO investigative teams means that cases are
developed under the continuous guidance of a
prosecutor, from the initiation of a ‘preparatory
investigation’ to conviction. In this way the chance
of case evidence being incorrectly collected is
drastically reduced. In addition, the insights and
conclusions of a multi-disciplinary group are
considered. This reduces the probability that
evidence or possible leads for further investigation
will be overlooked, as may be the case if there is a
single detective leading an investigation. 
The Scorpions have the additional advantage of
sufficient funding to contract and pay for the
services of specialist consultants, as well as to make
use of outside forensic auditors. This is necessary
due to the complicated nature of the types of crimes
being investigated. They are also able to follow
leads internationally, with all the cost implications
thereof. In short, the Scorpions are far better
resourced and funded than their SAPS counterparts
could ever hope to be.
There are other differences between DSO and SAPS
investigations. The DSO prosecution-led
investigation teams are able to become specialists.
This is because individual teams tend to
concentrate on one type of crime. Since they deal
with considerably fewer cases than SAPS
detectives, they are also able to spend more time
and concentrated attention on single cases.  On
the other hand, it has been estimated that each
docket-carrying SAPS detective has on average 70
dockets on hand (IHRCJS 2001: 7).4 Such a heavy
caseload also tends to mean that detectives take
shortcuts or simply mark dockets as ‘undetected’,
or ‘witness/es cannot be traced/found’, or
‘insufficient evidence available’ – all in an effort to
reduce their caseloads. So while DSO investigators
have become specialists, SAPS detectives have
become merely generalists, particularly since the
amalgamation of the specialist units into three core
focus groups. 
All things considered, the DSO has a much better
chance of a high success rate for convictions than
the SAPS, although one should bear in mind that
the Scorpions select cases on the basis of success
probabilities. This is shown for instance by the
results of the 2002/3 recording year where out of
167 finalised investigations and 117 finalised
prosecutions the DSO obtained 104 convictions
(Redpath 2004: 51). 
A recipe for friction
The public perception that the DSO is more
successful than the SAPS has led to friction and
envy between the DSO investigators and the SAPS
detectives. The better success rate has been
assisted by the fact that the DSO is able to
resource its far smaller number of investigators
infinitely better than their SAPS counterparts. The
high success rate and the perception that DSO
investigators are a ‘cut above’ meant that as they
became more successful, their morale grew –
again in contrast to the low morale evident among
many members of the SAPS, which is often
manifested in poor service delivery at police
stations. 
These perceptions of envy and resentment have
been confirmed in a number of field research
projects undertaken by the author over the last few
years, dealing inter alia with police service
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delivery, use of force by police, community policing
and the transformation of SAPS.
SAPS resentment towards the DSO has also been
greatly fanned by the fact that investigators in the
DSO are much better paid than their SAPS
counterparts. Even more galling to SAPS detectives
is the fact that many of their number left the police
for the more lucrative posts in the DSO. These
former SAPS detectives were invariably those with
many years of experience and built-up expertise. As
the SAPS Detectives Division was left with a smaller
pool of detectives, this started a vicious cycle of
training new recruits, then overloading them with
dockets so they had no time to give concentrated
focus to a more manageable number of dockets,
nor to build up specialist expertise.
In fact as early as 1994, only about 26 per cent of
detectives had been on a formal investigation
training course, while only 13 per cent of detectives
had over six years experience (White Paper 1998:
13). So within this situation the loss of experienced
detectives to the DSO had a double impact. In the
context of high crime levels and overloaded
detectives it was virtually impossible to implement
meaningful training programmes, as SAPS
detectives had no time to go on lengthy training
courses. 
The skills differences were further compounded
when DSO investigators received specialised
investigation training from both the FBI5 and the
London Metropolitan Police.6 While this was
happening the SAPS began amalgamating their
specialised detective units.7
Although the specialised units were not without
problems, the amalgamation meant that the overall
specialised investigative capacity of the SAPS was
reduced and the ‘surplus’ detectives (i.e. those who
were not taken up in the three specialist
investigation units that were established) were
reassigned back to police stations under the direct
management of a police station commissioner. This
once again diluted their specialised crime focus,
forcing them to try and deal with station case
backlogs of all crime dockets. Furthermore, the
creation of large but fewer multi-disciplinary
detective units to replace the multiplicity of
specialised units again led to SAPS detectives
becoming investigators of a whole range of crimes
instead of concentrating on a few selected crimes
and building expertise in those specific crime
fields.8
It is therefore no wonder that the Scorpions, with
their approach, appear to perform so much ‘better’
than the SAPS detectives. Even though the
Scorpions are accused of being selective (‘cherry
picking’) in the (high profile) cases that they took
on, and that their decisions to prosecute are often
based on the likelihood of obtaining a successful
conviction, there is no doubt that the Scorpions are
overall extremely effective in their investigations.
More importantly, because the DSO combines a
criminal law and criminal procedure approach with
a civil law perspective it is more effective at
addressing corruption than is the SAPS. In practical
terms this means that the Scorpions’ teams
incorporate the principles of asset recovery,
following the proceeds of crime and implementing
forfeiture and restitution within their overall
investigation approach. To this end the Scorpions
work closely on joint operations with the other two
NPA Investigative Directorates, namely the Asset
Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the Special Investigations
Unit (SIU), both of which were tasked, inter alia, to
look at all forms of high-level (i.e. large-scale)
corrupt practices, particularly in government
departments. 
One of the unfortunate misconceptions in the
debate about the DSO has been caused by lumping
together the activities, investigations, cases and
eventual joint prosecutions of the three Investigative
Directorates of the NPA, namely the DSO, the SIU
and the AFU. While they have often undertaken
joint operations, these have usually been reported
as being solely the work of the Scorpions. While the
units support or complement each other’s work and
investigations, they remain independent of one
another and work on different cases. The SIU and
AFU often become involved in the later stages of
DSO-led investigations. Closing down the DSO will
break down this investigative ‘troika’ and is likely to
compromise their overall effectiveness.
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Some concluding remarks
The differences between the SAPS and the DSO
present very real obstacles. The Government’s new
General Law Amendment Bill9 makes no mention of
whether the ‘investigative approach’ developed by
the Scorpions will be retained in the proposed new
SAPS Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation
(DPCI). Furthermore, in the new Bill the implied
emphasis has been solely on ‘fighting organised
crime’. No mention is made of other crime focuses,
notably corruption.
Members of the Scorpions have been leaving the
unit in droves since its disbandment and absorption
(restructuring) was first mooted. This represents a
huge loss of specialist investigative skills and
expertise that the new DPCI would have to replace,
or train up new recruits.
While the Minister of Safety and Security has
publicly proclaimed that the DPCI will continue to
investigate all current cases of the Scorpions, the
DSO investigators have voiced concerns that they
would not be investigated with the same vigour or
in the same manner as the Scorpions did. A further
obstacle to their incorporation has been their fears
that they will be required to fit into the same old
police culture and manner of conducting
investigations as has become standard in the SAPS
(reactive, overloaded, overworked and rushed,
without access to supporting colleagues or outside
specialists, nor continual consultation with a
prosecutor).
Questions have also been raised whether the new
DPCI would be resourced and funded at the same
level as the Scorpions’. And does the SAPS have the
necessary infrastructure, resources and funding to
handle sophisticated organised crime cases?
Other practical concerns that have been raised deal
with such aspects as the higher remuneration
received by the Scorpions and whether they would
still be paid on the same level.
Another stated intent contained in the Bill is that all
new members will be selected by the National
Police Commissioner. This is understood by
Scorpions members to be a thinly veiled political
aim to screen, weed out and get rid of all those
perceived to be politically incompatible with
government’s ‘fight against crime’. To this end
government members have made wild statements
about the Scorpions being populated largely by
former ‘apartheid spies’. Facing this attitude, not
only towards their investigation approach, but also
to their professionalism and loyalty to the
government, many Scorpions investigators have
come away with the feeling that the SAPS does not
really want to employ any of them in the new
DPCI, nor does it want to make use of their
specialist investigation skills, or implement (for
continuity) any form of prosecution-led
investigations. It has also been stated publicly that
the DPCI will not be allowed to pick only cases
that it wants to investigate but has to investigate all
cases of high-impact organised crime. Such a result
makes a further mockery of the stated intent of the
Bill that the DPCI will be a ‘specialist investigation
unit’.
It is then not surprising that it is being asked
whether any of the existing members of the
Scorpions will ever willingly accept employment
with and incorporation into the new DPCI. Simply
put, it is doubtful whether the SAPS will have the
capacity (without incorporating all the Scorpions
investigators into the new unit) to continue with, let
alone improve on, the case successes of the DSO,
and whether the fight against corruption will be a
focus of the new DPCI. Finally, whether the DPCI
will ever become the mooted ‘super-unit’, as
intended, remains to be seen.
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Endnotes
1 I would like to acknowledge and thank my 
colleagues, Prof. Johan Prinsloo and Dr Rudolph Zinn,
for their insightful comments and the informal
discussions I had with both regarding the content of
this article.
2 For instance they have steadfastly resisted being told 
to close or abandon any cases (unlike certain
instances where National Commissioner Selebi has
allegedly done so) on non-legal or non-investigation
grounds by not brooking any interference in the whole
process.
3 This has been more sporadic than formally
implemented in the SAPS, and there has been
opposition to its use in the SAPS, being largely based
on the use of modus operandi and perpetrator
profiling crime information as well as the recent
implementation (only at selected police stations) of
spatial (GIS) crime analysis as an adjunct to reported
crime statistics. See Zinn (2008) for a more detailed
analysis of intelligence-led policing).
4 The internationally accepted (Interpol) docket 
caseload norm is an average of 23 dockets per
detective.
5 A number of selected investigators were even trained 
at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia (near
Washington).
6 Others received different training (in intelligence 
gathering and analysis for instance) at the Bramshill
Training Centre north of London in the UK.
7 Before the restructuring of the Detective Service began 
in 2000, there were 534 specialized units in the
Detective Service, which led not only to fragmentation
of investigations but to the non-sharing of information
or any close co-operation in investigating similar
cases. 
8 See Minnaar (2008 forthcoming).
9 This amends the South African Police Service Act. A
second Bill, which repeals the Scorpions provisions in
the National Prosecuting Authority Act, has not yet
been tabled in Parliament, although it was also
approved by the cabinet at the same time (end of April
2008).
